Egypt, the self-serving peace broker of the Middle East, has wriggled and twisted its way through the Gaza crisis. The noncommittal stance characteristic of the fragile Mubarak regime, has lurched uncomfortably between unconfirmed collaboration with Israel, to
criticism verging on condemnation.
Mubarak surely knows that the National Democratic Regime has little credibility in the eyes of the Egyptian populace, so why even bother trying to distance itself from the Egyptian-Israeli connection, made so clear through that poisoned, yet forever iconic photo of
Abu al-
Gheit shaking hands with Israeli foreign minister
Tzipi Livni. More recently, Mubarak, in the Arab summit held in Doha, Kuwait on the 19th January, stated that Hamas, in refusing to extend the truce which had ended in December, had 'invited' Israeli troops into the coastal enclave.
Egypt's moves on the international stage resemble something akin to Saturday Night Fever, only not so smooth. It was always the end of the conflict that would implicate Egypt as the third lover in the Gaza triangle; with the swift withdrawal of Israeli troops and tanks from from the strip, the cry for Egypt to open its borders is as loud and piercing as ever.
Tunnel of contentionBut the issue that has caused the most consternation for peace and security enthusiasts over the past year is that of the smugglers tunnels in the 'Philadelphi corridor', which allegedly run into the thousands figure, that weave up and under the borders like a
anachrid's subterranean web.
Israel's aims, stated at the onset of the war, were to eliminate these tunnels, through surveillance and bombardment. A double-pronged attack against both the Hamas fighters and the membrane through which their life-source is filtered, would theoretically strangle this troublesome cell and starve it of its military sustenance.
But a week after a cease fire was unilaterally declared, first, unilaterally by Israel, and then unilaterally by Hamas, the tunnels are still very much in use, causing international spectators to point the finger at Egypt.
For all it's stifling obsession with internal security and acute military presence, the Egypt government either can't, or won't move it's dancing shoes over to Northern Sinai and jiggle back into the West's good books by putting a lid on the tunnels and dismantling the smuggling system on its side of the border.
I find it hard to believe Egyptian friends' protestations that the Egyptian security system simply 'does not know where these tunnels are located'. To agree with such notions would be slighting the great intelligence system that Egypt has built up over decades of dictatorship.
Others give credence to the notion that Egypt does not have an ounce of political will in eliminating the tunnel system, as it is in ideological cahoots with the resistance in Gaza, and is covertly seeking an end to the State of Israel through surreptitious means. As easy and naive as this notion sounds, it is not as absurd as the former; yes, Mubarak and his acolytes hate and fear
Hamas with a dread not dissimilar to that of Israel's, but the last thing he wants is a Palestinian exodus into Egyptian territory, potentially
strengthening and radicalising the already hefty Muslim Brotherhood and putting an extra strain on the flailing Egyptian economy. In supporting the
Hamas resistance within the strip itself, the
Phaoronic regime, as it is often referred to by Egyptian opposition, might hope to contain
Hamas and channel resentment towards Israel, and away from Egypt.
Bedouin paradise However, there remains one, very compelling argument that has been suggested as to why Egypt appears so reluctant to act on international pressure and shut up the cross border arms smuggling business. These grounds for Egyptian inaction have less to do with ideological or theological precepts and far more to do with on the ground pragmatic real
politik inside Egypt.
The '
Bedouin issue' within Egypt is one that has won little media attention outside the travel supplements of foreign newspapers. Indeed, it has had to compete with so much else happening in the Middle East: wars, for example. But despite its relative backwater of a location and its status as a reserve for holiday makers, Sinai is not only a veritable wild-west, but a hotbed for civil unrest.
The Bedouins of Sinai see themselves as different from urbanised Egyptians, both culturally, and ethnically. They also see themselves as
persecuted, uprooted from their ancestral dwelling places in the name of vicious state touristic ventures. For many tribes, a traditional and cherished fishing livelihood has been irreversibly damaged by the takeover of coastal areas by real-estate developers and fat-cat tourism companies.
Discriminated and bereft, they feel no compulsion to cooperate with the Egyptian regime, and with the power and innate geographical knowledge they have over this
spiritually holy, and strategically vital
natural buffer region, the regime cannot afford to incur their wrath further by clamping down on their profiteering.
It is known, though not confirmed,
therefore, that it is
largely Bedouin traders who are engaged in the underworldly cross-border dealings. It also cannot be ruled out that certain powers that be are taking a cut. If that is the case, it could be said that the regime is indeed 'in cahoots' financially, if not ideologically, with the smuggling business.
Either way, the Bedouin issue is a raw nerve in the Egyptian iron fist. Tempting those profiteering from hostilities away from tunnel life will be a tough, if not an impossible job that will come at a price. Much to the chagrin of Israel, it will not be a price Egypt is willing to pay.